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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
IN NEW YORK LAW
Hynes v. Tomei: The New York Court ofAppeals declares certain
plea provisions of the New York capital punishment statute
unconstitutional as they needlessly encourage guilty pleas by
allowing criminal defendants to avoid the possibility of a death
sentence by waiving their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
The resurrection of the death penalty as a possible sentence
for conviction of murder in the first degree1 has brought with it
unique plea machinery by which prosecutors and defendants negotiate in a criminal proceeding.2 On December 22, 1998, the
New York State Court of Appeals, in Hynes v. Tomei,3 invalidated two plea provisions of the capital punishment statute that
allowed criminal defendants charged with first degree murder to
forego a jury trial, plead guilty, and thus avoid the possibility of
a death sentence. 4 The Court of Appeals, tracking the Supreme
1 See N.Y. CRiL. PROC. LAW § 400.27(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999) (authorizing
the court to "promptly conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine
whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment"); see also
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1998) (defining murder in the first degree).
2 See generally Gary Spencer, Death Penalty'sPlea Provision is Struck: Bar on
Executing Those Forgoing Trial Violates Constitution,N.Y. L.J., Dec. 23, 1998, at 1
(explaining how the ban on executing those who have waived their right to trial
violates the Constitution); Daniel Wise, Problems Seen in CorrectingNew York Law,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 23, 1998, at 1 (discussing how the invalidation of the death penalty
statute's plea provision impacts upon plea negotiations).
3 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998). This Court of Appeals case was a consolidation
of two cases from the Second and Fourth Departments of the Appellate Division. See
Relin v. Connell, 674 N.Y.S.2d 192 (2d Dep't 1998), rev'd, Hynes v. Tomei, 706
N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998); Hynes v. Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687 (App. Div. 1997), rev'd,
706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
4 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10(5)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1999):
A defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the crime of murder in the
first degree as defined in section 125.27 of the penal law; provided, however, that a defendant may enter such a plea with both the permission of
the court and the consent of the people when the agreed upon sentence is
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Court's decision in United States v. Jackson,5 declared sections
220.10(5)(e) and 220.30(3)(b)(vii) of the New York Criminal Procedure law unconstitutional, as they " 'needlessly' encourage[d]
6
guilty pleas in violation of Jackson."
The Hynes decision may have unsettling ramifications in
two areas of the law with respect to capital punishment. A sentence of death based on a guilty plea may be barred by Article 1,
Section 2 of the New York State Constitution. 7 Moreover, even if
corrective legislation could remedy the constitutional infirmity of
murder
the plea provisions, plea negotiations in first-degree
8
impossibility.
practical
a
be
nonetheless
may
cases

either life imprisonment... or a term of imprisonment for the class A-I
felony of murder in the first degree ....
Id.; see also N.Y. CRI. PROC. § 220.30(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 1999) (repeating verbatim section 220.10(5)(e)).
5 390 U.S. 570, 583, 591 (1968) (invalidating the capital punishment clause of
the Federal Kidnapping Act because it "needlessly encourages" pleas of guilty in
violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1994)
("Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines.... kidnaps... any person... shall be punished by imprisonment... and, if the death of any person results, shall be punished
by death or life imprisonment."). When Jackson was heard before the Supreme
Court in 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) contained the following clause: "shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if
the verdict of the jury shall so recommend." See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 571 (quoting
18 U.S.C. 1201(a) (1964)).
6 Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1208. "Jackson compels us to invalidate these provisions." Id. at 1207.
7 See N.Y. CONST. 1 § 2 ("A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all
criminal cases, except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by
death.. . ."); see also James R. Acker, When the Cheering Stopped:An Overview and
Analysis of New York's Death Penalty Legislation, 17 PACE L. REV. 41, 93 (1996)
(suggesting that the plea provisions violate the New York Constitution even if a
guilty plea renders the death penalty inapplicable because it allows a defendant to
waive a jury trial for a" 'crime' that 'may be punishable by death' "); Hon. Stewart
F. Hancock, Jr. et al., Does New York's Death Penalty Statute Violate the New York
Constitution?, 14 TOURO L. REv. 715, 727 (1998) (explaining that the State Constitution has a provision directly prohibiting the ability to waive a jury in a capital
case where a guilty verdict would result in execution); Wise, supra note 2, at 1
("[S]everal Prosecutors have warned that a state constitutional prohibition may
thwart efforts to remedy the defect the Court identified in... Matter of Hynes v.
Tomei.").
8 See Wise, supra note 2, at 1 ("Prosecutors and defense lawyers said.., that
the opinion would make the negotiation of pleas quite difficult once a prosecutor had
served notice that the death penalty would be sought.").
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The plea provisions were declared unconstitutional by the
trial courts in People v. Hale9 and People v. Mateo.10 In both proceedings, negotiated pleas were rejected by Justices Connell and
Tomei, respectively."
Declaratory judgment actions were
brought before the appellate divisions of the Second and Fourth
Departments and the plea provisions were subsequently declared constitutional. 12 The Court of Appeals concluded that
Jackson compelled the opposite result and reversed the appellate
division. 13 Chief Judge Kaye, writing for the Court of Appeals,
noted that capital defendants would have "fewer opportunities to
avoid the possibility of the death penalty" because of the court's
decision to strike down sections 220.10(5)(e) and 220.30(3)(b)(vii)
of the capital punishment statute. 14
The Court of Appeals compared the sentencing clause of the
Federal Kidnapping Act (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964)), at issue in
Jackson,to New York's plea provisions. The court noted that the
Act authorized the death penalty only on a recommendation from
the jury, "while a defendant convicted of the same offense on a
guilty plea or by a Judge escaped the threat of capital punishment."15 After exhaustively analyzing the similarities between
the clause at issue in Jackson and the New York plea provisions,
Chief Judge Kaye concluded that only those defendants who exercised their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination
9 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1997), rev'd, Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201
(N.Y. 1998).
10 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Monroe County Ct. 1997).
11 See id. at 982; Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
12 See Relin v. Connell, 674 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (4th Dep't 1998) (holding that
"[c]ontrary to Mateo's contention, those provisions do not violate the New York Constitution); Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
13 See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1209.
14 Id. (calling the result an "ironic twist"). Moreover, Chief Judge Kaye was cognizant that the result of the Hynes decision would be to reduce the "flexibility of
both prosecutors and defendants who wish to plea bargain in capital cases." Id.
15 Id. at 1204. In Jackson,the Supreme Court concluded that the creation of two
classes of defendants, one by conviction (penalty of death), and one by plea (penalty
of imprisonment), created a situation in which defendants would be encouraged to
waive jury trials and plead guilty. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581
(1968) ("The inevitable effect of any such provision... is to discourage assertion of
the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth
Amendment right to demand a jury trial."); accord Pope v. United States, 392 U.S.
651 (1968) (per curiam) (vacating a death sentence under the Federal Bank Robbery
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), because of the same constitutional infirmity as that suffered by the Federal Kidnapping Act).
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and Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial placed themselves at
risk of death. 16 Respondents argued that sections 220.10 (5)(e)
and 220.30 (3)(b)(vii), which are identical and provide that a "defendant may enter such a plea with both the permission of the
court and the consent of the people," were distinguishable from
the Federal Kidnapping Act at issue in Jackson.'7 Contrasting
the capital punishment statutes of various states, Chief Judge
Kaye concluded that those statutes which survived constitutional scrutiny contained no guarantee that a plea of guilty
would result in a sentence lesser than the maximum sentence
that could be imposed after conviction at trial. 18 Finally, Chief
Judge Kaye addressed arguments which attempted to distinguish Jackson on the grounds that the bifurcated trial and sentencing system in New York was different from the unitary trial
and sentencing system in Jackson, thus alleviating the "chilling
effect" on a defendant's constitutional right. 19 She dismissed
16 See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1207; People v. Michael A.C., 261 N.E.2d 620, 625
(N.Y. 1970) (holding that procedures which offer more severe penalties for those
who assert a fundamental constitutional right than for those who do not cannot be
sustained).
17 See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1206. Respondents argued that defendants never
had unilateral control of the plea bargaining process because the statute did not
give defendants a choice between facing death by asserting trial rights or pleading
guilty and avoiding death. See id. at 1205. The court responded by stating that "the
need to obtain approval from the People and the court will not save plea provisions
that otherwise violate Jackson." See id. at 1206. Appellants also argued that section
220.60(2)(a) of the N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law was unconstitutional. This statute
allows a criminal defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any time before the rendition of the verdict. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.60(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
"A defendant who has entered a plea of not guilty to an indictment may, with both
the permission of the court and the consent of the people, withdraw [the] plea at any
time before the rendition of a verdict and enter: (a) a plea of guilty to part of the indictment. ... " Id. This section of the statute was, however, upheld by the Hynes
court because it affected non-capital offenses as well. See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at
1208.
18 See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1206 (noting the respondent's reliance on Corbitt v.
New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978), which held that a state may offer benefits to defendants in exchange for guilty pleas). Chief Judge Kaye pointed out that the New
Jersey statute at issue in Corbitt provided for the possibility of the maximum penalty through either a plea of guilty or a conviction at trial. See id.
19 Id. at 1206-07. Respondent's argument was that during the sentencing phase
even after a defendant has been convicted at trial, there was the opportunity to
agree to a sentence even after the guilt phase. See id. at 1207. The Court responded
by stating that this possibility did not cure the statute of the Jackson effect. Moreover, the court noted that a prosecutor might be "less willing to forego pursuit of the
death penalty after a defendant's guilt has been established." Id. Ultimately, "[tihe
question is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional; the
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these arguments by concluding that the bifurcation did not alter
the "statutory framework that allows the possibility of death
only after a jury trial."2 0 Moreover, Chief Judge Kaye noted that
although the plea provisions had been struck down, a defendant
was not precluded from entering a plea of guilty to first degree
murder when the district attorney has not yet filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. This was because "defendants in
that situation face the maximum sentence regardless of how
they are convicted."2l
"[Sitate statutes under scrutiny carry with them a strong
presumption of constitutionality. 22 In concluding that this presumption was not strong enough to overcome the constitutional
infirmity of §§ 220.10(5)(e) and 220.30(3)(b)(vii), the Hynes court
opened up a wound in the capital punishment statute that corrective legislation may not be able to repair.23 The nexus of the
Hynes opinion was that a constitutionally compliant capital
statute required the possibility of the same maximum sentence
upon a plea of guilty as upon conviction at a jury trial.24 Thus,
after Hynes, a New York criminal defendant charged with first
degree murder would, if he chose to make use of the plea machinery, have to accept the possibility of a death sentence, the
maximum penalty under the capital statute.2 Hynes, however,
question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive." Jackson,
390 U.S. at 582.
20 Hynes, 706 N.E 2d at 1207. Chief Judge Kaye declared that capital defendants under the New York statute "who are awaiting trial and are offered a plea are
still faced with the choice Jackson declared unconstitutional." Id.
21 Id. at 1209. While a death notice is pending, a defendant is constitutionally
barred from waiving his jury rights. See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
22 People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456,462 (N.Y. 1977).
23 The key to the New York capital punishment statute is that it maneuvers
around the constitutional prohibitions outlined in article 1, section 2 of the New
York State Constitution. This section prohibits a defendant from waiving a jury trial
when the maximum penalty for the crime charged is death. See N.Y. CONST. art 1, §
2.
24 "[The death penalty statutes of States that have rejected a Jackson challenge, with one exception, provide for the possibility of a death sentence upon a
guilty plea." See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1207. The exception referred to was the Arkansas capital statute which requires the judge to make the final determination as
to whether the death penalty would be imposed. Moreover, guilty pleas were allowed only after waiver by the prosecutor of intention to seek the death penalty. See
Ruiz v. State, 630 S.W.2d 44,46-47 (Ark. 1982) (per curiam).
25 See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1208 ("[E]xcision of the capital pleading provisions
eliminates the burden on constitutional rights prohibited by Jackson, since without
those provisions there is only one maximum penalty [death]."); see also N.Y. CRIM.
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failed to account for the statutory and constitutional walls that
block a defendant from even trying to plea bargain in such a
situation. 26 Under section 320.10(1) of the New York Criminal
Procedure Law, a defendant cannot waive a jury trial when the
charge is first degree murder.27 Therefore, a defendant who
wanted to plead guilty to first degree murder could not do so.
Further, even if corrective legislation could be introduced to repeal this provision, a capital defendant is barred by the state
constitution from waiving a jury trial when the crime charged
carries with it a possible penalty of death.28 This represents a
two-fold obstacle to a defendant who wishes to exercise plea options that may be available. Adding another legal difficulty into
the equation, the language in Hynes now compels a prosecutor to
withdraw a notice of intent to seek the death penalty should he
29
or she wish to enter into plea negotiations with the defendant.
The proverbial "catch" is that once a notice of intent to seek the
death penalty is withdrawn it can no longer be re-filed and the
defendant is no longer at risk of death.30

PROC. LAW § 320.10(1) (McKinney 1993) ("Except where the indictment charges the
crime of murder in the first degree, the defendant... may at any time before trial
waive a jury trial and consent to a trial without a jury ... ."). A jury trial also cannot be waived in a capital murder case because it would violate article 1, section 2 of
the New York State Constitution, which expressly prohibits waiver of a jury trial in
capital cases. See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2. A defendant's options are significantly
narrowed, as he is now both statutorily and constitutionally blocked from pleading
guilty to first degree murder.
26 Except for the crime of first degree murder, a "defendant may as a matter of
right enter a plea of 'guilty' to the entire indictment." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
220.10(2) (McKinney 1993); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.10(1) (McKinney
1993) (allowing a defendant as a matter of state law to waive jury trials and consent
to trial without a jury when the indictment does not charge the crime of murder in
the first degree); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
27 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.10(1) (McKinney 1993).
- See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, §2.
29 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.40(4) (McKinney 1999) ("A notice of intent to
seek the death penalty may be withdrawn at any time by a written notice of withdrawal filed with the court and served upon the defendant. Once withdrawn the notice of intent to seek the death penalty may not be refiled"). New York's Criminal
Procedure Law allows the prosecutor to enter plea negotiations when the agreed
upon sentence is life imprisonment without parole or imprisonment. See N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii). "Under the resulting statute, a defendant
may not plead guilty to first degree murder while a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty is pending." Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1208-09 (N.Y. 1998).
30 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.40(4) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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The logical conclusion to this exercise is that a defendant,
now aware that a death sentence is no longer a possibility, will
naturally seek to assert Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial.
Furthermore, it is suggested that there will be little incentive for
the defendant to honor plea agreements because the maximum
penalties are the same under either scheme.3 ' This was the case
in People v. Hale,32 the proceeding that gave rise to the Hynes

opinion, where "Justice Tomei had blocked entry of a plea to a
term of 50 years to life [while the] death notice remained effective."33 The plea bargain agreement was available for a variety

of sentences, all for non-capital offenses.3 4 Thus, the agreement
satisfied complicated state statutory and constitutional constraints against entering guilty pleas and waiving jury trials in
first degree capital murder cases because the crimes pleaded to
35
were all non-capital offenses.
By invalidating this type of scheme under Jackson, Hynes
presents an all or nothing situation. If a prosecutor chooses to
seek death, no guilty plea may be entered to a capital murder
charge, and the defendant is forced to go to trial and risk death.
If a defendant wishes to plead, then it must be to a non-capital
offense, precluding the possibility of death or life imprisonment

31 See Hynes v. Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 n.1 (2d Dep't 1997), rev'd, Hynes,
706 N.E.2d 1201. ("[A] defendant would inevitably choose to withdraw from the plea
bargain negotiations and proceed to trial where he would no longer be subject to the
possibility of the death sentence."). See Wise, supranote 2 (reporting that the Hynes
decision "would make the negotiations at pleas quite difficult once a prosecutor had
served notice that the death penalty would be sought"). Under the Hynes formulation, pleas to lesser counts would be allowed, "but not to a capital murder count
while the death notice remained in place." Id. Only a capital defendant charged with
first degree murder could be sentenced to life without parole as no lesser count has
this as a sentence. See id. Moreover, "[pirosecutors will be reluctant to withdraw
death notices because under the state law, once they are withdrawn, they cannot be
reinstated." Id. Furthermore, the Hynes decision creates a legal situation where defendants would have "tremendous incentive.., to renege on plea promises once the
death penalty is withdrawn because the worst possible penalty they would face if
they went to trial would be life without parole." Id.
32 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1997), rev'd, Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201
(N.Y. 1998).

33 Wise, supra note 2.
4 See Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 688 ("Various provisions of New York's Criminal
Procedure Law... enable a defendant.., to avoid any possibility of a death sentence by entering into a plea bargain agreement with the People.").

35 See id.
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without parole, because life imprisonment without parole is re36
served for capital murder only.
A proper analysis of the Jackson opinion and its progeny indicates that the Supreme Court was loath to invalidate plea
agreements entered for fear of receiving the death penalty
alone. 37 Even in Jackson, the Court recognized that the plea apparatus was essential to the operation of an efficient and flexible
criminal process. 38 The death provision in the Federal Kidnapping Act, at issue in Jackson, had, as its trial and sentencing apparatus, a unitary system in which the sentence of death was
imposed by a jury recommendation only, and which the judge
was compelled to follow. 39 The Act did not have any plea system
in place by which a defendant could receive the death penalty
upon a plea of guilty. 40 Moreover, the Court rejected the government's argument that the Act alleviated the "increased hazard of capital punishment" by authorizing the judge to set aside
3 See Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1209 (N.Y. 1998) (referencing the reduced flexibility that would result from the Hynes decision between prosecutors and
defendants who wished to utilize the plea apparatus). Moreover, Chief Judge Kaye
noted that such a case like this "might be decided differently today in light of the
increased significance of plea bargaining and substantial changes in the administration of capital punishment." Id. Chief Judge Kaye, seemingly reluctantly, acceded to the authority of the Supreme Court, perhaps indicating that, if there were
another way, the court would have decided the case differently. "[Alithough the Supreme Court itself may revisit its interpretation of Federal constitutional provisions, State courts are bound under the Federal Constitution to follow controlling
Supreme Court precedent, and Jackson compels the result here." Id. "[While a defendant may not plead guilty to first degree murder while a notice of intent to seek
the death penalty is pending, plea bargaining to lesser offenses even when a notice
of intent is pending, or to first degree murder in the absence of notice of intent remains unaffected." Id.
37 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In this case, the defendant
sought post-judgment relief because he had entered a guilty plea to the Federal
Kidnapping Act. Id. at 743. In reliance on Jackson, he claimed his plea had been
motivated by a fear of the death penalty. Id. at 744-45. Justice White, writing for
the majority, stated, "a plea of guilty is not invalid... because [it is] entered to
avoid the possibility of the death penalty." Id. at 755.
38 See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 584 (1968) (recognizing that the
rejection of all guilty pleas would create an inflexible and unworkable criminal system).
39 See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570-71 (discussing former statute 18 U.S.C. §
1201(a)). The specific language of the statute was that anyone who unlawfully kidnaps "shall be punished by death... if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend."
Id. at 571. The only discretion the trial judge had was to void the death sentence if
the kidnapped person were liberated unharmed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), reprinted in, Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570-71.
40 See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 572.
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a verdict of death if, within discretional bounds, he or she felt
compelled to do so. 4 1 The Act provided, in the final instance, for

a jury verdict of either death or imprisonment, sentence to be
imposed by the jury only. Conspicuously absent was the existence of any plea machinery by which a defendant could plead
guilty and suffer the possibility of death.42 The core of the Jackson opinion was the prevention of two classes of defendants, each
guilty of the same crime but with the jury class risking death
and the pleading class at ease with the knowledge that their
43
lives would be spared.
The death penalty statute in New York contains a bifurcated
operating structure. The first phase of the statute requires a
jury trial to determine guilt or innocence of the charge of first
degree murder. The second stage requires an entirely separate
proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. 4 Upon jury conviction of the defendant for first degree
murder, the sentencing phase begins and the jury must weigh
aggravating and mitigating factors presented by the prosecutor
and defendant, respectively, so that it can decide the appropriate
sentence to be levied upon the defendant. 45 Once the jury has
41 See id. at 573. The Court was correct in its analysis, for the Judge could only
set aside a verdict of death if the kidnapping victim was liberated unharmed.
Moreover, the court examined the legislative history of the statute and concluded
that Congress specifically sought to remove the power to inflict a death sentence
from the judge to the jury, in defiance of settled federal practice. See id. at 575. "The
difficulty is that Congress intentionally discarded that tradition when it passed the
Federal Kidnapping [sic] Act. Congress rejected a version of the Kidnapping [sic]
Act that would have left punishment to the court's discretion... ." Id. at 575-76.
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (amended 1984), reprinted in, Jackson, 390 U.S. at
570-71.
43 "Under the Federal Kidnapping [sic] Act ... the defendant who abandons the
right to contest his guilt before a jury is assured that he cannot be executed; the defendant ingenuous enough to seek a jury acquittal stands forewarned that, if the
jury finds him guilty and does not wish to spare his life, he will die." Jackson, 390
U.S. at 581.
44See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999). "If the jury
unanimously determines that a sentence of death should be imposed, the court must
thereupon impose a sentence of death." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(11)(d)
(McKinney Supp. 1999).
-5 See N.Y. CRIML PROC. LAW § 400.27(3)-(9) (McKinney Supp. 1999). Sections
three through eight provide for the presentation of what are and what are not aggravating factors. Aggravating factors are such factors as outlined in section 125.27
(first degree murder definition) of the penal law and those factors must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. With the exception of subdivision seven, the ter-
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considered all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, the
judge will charge the jurors and they will be instructed that they
must be unanimous with respect to either sentence, or the judge
must sentence the defendant to a term of life imprisonment. 46
The jury may not "direct imposition of a sentence of death unless
it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factor or factors substantially outweigh the mitigating
factor or factors established... and unanimously determines
47
that the penalty of death should be imposed."
New York's capital punishment statute, which adds this
separate sentencing proceeding, is distinguishable from the Federal Kidnapping Act considered in Jackson in that guilt and sentence are determined separately under New York's statutory
scheme. 48 This distinction does not carry with it substantive
significance until it is considered that the defendant in Jackson
"could plead guilty as of right to the capital kidnapping charge,
and thus avoid the death penalty by his own unilateral action."49
The New York capital plea provisions, in contrast, "prohibit a
capital defendant from pleading guilty, as of right, to murder in
the first degree; rather, they merely grant the People the discretion to enter into a plea bargain agreement with the capital defendant so as to remove the case from the capital punishment
track."50 The key distinction in New York's capital plea provisions is that, while a defendant may wish to enter a plea in order
to avoid risk of a death sentence, it is within the discretion of the
prosecutor and the court to engage the defendant in plea negororism exception, no other aggravating factors can be considered. See N.Y. CRIB.
PROC. LAW § 400.27(3) (McKinney Supp. 1999). Section nine of the statute gives a
non-exclusive list of mitigating factors which may be presented during the pre-

sentence proceeding (including reliable hearsay evidence) by the defendant as to
why he should not be put to death. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §400.27(9) (McKinney
1995).
46 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(10) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
47 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(11)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
48 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
49 Hynes v. Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687, 690 (2d Dep't 1997), rev'd, Hynes v.
Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
50 Id. The exact language of the statute in sections 220.10(5)(e) and
220.30(3)(b)(vii) provides that "[a] defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the
crime of murder in the first degree ....

however, .. . a defendant may enter such a

plea with both the permission of the court and the consent of the people when
the.., sentence is... life imprisonment without parole ... " N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii) (amended 1995) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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tiations. Should they choose not to, the defendant is in the same
position he was before: charged with capital murder and faced
with a possible sentence of death.51 It is this unilateral control of
the pleading apparatus, which the defendant possessed in Jackson as a matter of right, by which he or she could avoid risk of
death simply through the unilateral action of pleading guilty.
This is not available to a capital defendant in New York. More
simply put, a New York capital defendant can wish all he or she
wants to enter plea negotiations and avert the possibility of
death, but if the prosecutor and court do not wish to, the defen52
dant will face the possibility of death.
The Supreme Court, after its opinion in Jackson, narrowed
its application of the "needless encouragement" standard in
Brady v. United States.53 In Brady, a defendant's application for
post judgment relief under the same death provision of the same
Federal Kidnapping Act invalidated in Jackson was denied, on
the ground that his plea of guilty was "needless ly] encourage[d]"
by the risk of death.5 4 In North Carolinav. Alford,55 a defendant
indicted for first degree murder (a capital offense), entered a
guilty plea with the consent of the People to second degree murder which was not punishable by death. 6 In rejecting his argument that his plea was invalid under Jackson, the Court reiterated its holding in Brady. According to the Court, a plea of
51 See id.
52 The court in Hynes addressed this contention by concluding that the involvement of the People in the plea process does not prevent "needless encouragement" of
guilty pleas. See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1205. Moreover, the court cited State v. Atkinson, 167 S.E.2d 241, 259 (1969), rev'd, Atkinson v. North Carolina,403 U.S. 948

(1971), where the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional North Carolina's capital
pleading statute. See id. The statute allowed the defendant to tender a plea and, if
the court and People accepted it, the sentence would be life imprisonment. See Atkinson, 167 S.E.2d at 259. If they did not accept it then the case would go to trial on
a plea of not guilty, and the defendant would be exposed to the death penalty. See
id. The Supreme Court reversed the sentence of death without comment See Atkinson, 403 U.S. 948.
53 397 U.S. 742, 746 (1970). The court ruled in response to defendant's claim in
reliance on Jackson that his guilty plea was "needlessly encouraged" because of the
death penalty provision in the Federal Kidnapping Act. Id. The Court responded
that a "plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the possibility of
a death penalty." Id. at 755.
54 Id. at 746.

55 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
66 See id. at 29 (noting that the maximum penalty for second-degree murder is
thirty years in prison).
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guilty entered to avoid a possible death sentence was not neces57
sarily "compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment."
The defendant in Alford, under oral examination, indicated that
he was pleading guilty to avoid the death penalty and in the
58
same breath maintained his innocence of the criminal charges.
Justice Brennan forcefully argued in his dissenting opinion that
"such a denial of guilt is... a relevant factor in determining
whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made" and
that "the facts set out in the majority opinion demonstrate that
[the defendant] was 'so gripped by fear of the death penalty' that
his decision to plead guilty was not voluntary. 59
In Parker v. North Carolina,60 the Supreme Court upheld a
sentence of life imprisonment for a fifteen year old boy who pled
guilty to burglary, which was a capital offense. The Court stated
that it "may be that under [Jackson] it was unconstitutional to
impose the death penalty under the statutory framework which
existed in North Carolina at the time of Parker's plea."61 The
Court concluded, however, that based on its decision in Brady,
"an otherwise valid plea is not involuntary because induced by
the defendant's desire to limit the possible maximum penalty to
62
less than that authorized if there is a jury trial."
The Hynes opinion points out that subsequent to these decisions, the Supreme Court summarily reversed several death sentences imposed under North Carolina's capital statute. 63 These
subsequent cases are in apparent contradiction to Brady, Alford,
and Parker. On the one hand, the Court was upholding sentences rendered under capital pleading schemes that were
seemingly stricken in Jackson, while, on the other, it was vacating death sentences levied upon convictions under the same
57 Id. at 31. The lower court orally examined the defendant to see whether his
plea was voluntary or not. The defendant maintained that he was "not guilty" but
that he was "pleading guilty" to avoid the death penalty. Id. This is precisely the
kind of situation the court reacted against in Jackson. The Court however, did not
invalidate his plea. Perhaps the Supreme Court was trying to erode some of the
ramifications of Jackson on the pleading process.
68 See id. at 29.

69 Id. at 40 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
60 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
61 Id. at 794-95.
62 Id. at 795.
63 See, e.g., Atkinson v. North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971); Roseboro v. North
Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971); Williams v. North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971). The
Court simply cited Jackson without opinion and reversed the death sentences.
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statute. 64 It appears the Supreme Court was actually targeting
the imposition of the death penalty itself within these statutes
and not the plea provisions per se. This was accomplished by
upholding "valid pleas" where the defendants had received
prison sentences and striking down death sentences imposed
under these statutes containing the plea schemes.65 Thus,
rather than strike down a plea system that results in a lesser
maximum sentence than if there were a trial, the Court simply
invalidated all death sentences resulting from that very same
system. This was an attempt to compensate and equalize the
maximum penalties received through either a plea sentence or a
66
conviction sentence.
Application of this analysis to Hynes suggests that the Court
of Appeals could have decided, in accordance with the Supreme
Court's most recent decisions on the matter, to uphold valid
pleas under the capital plea provisions, and to reverse any death
sentences resulting from any convictions under the same statute.
In Hynes, the argument supporting the constitutionality of New
York's capital plea provisions relied heavily on the Supreme
64 Compare Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) and North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (upholding sentences not resulting in death) with Atkinson v. North Carolina, 403 U.S.
948 (1971) and Roseboro v. North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971) and Williams v.
North Carolina, 403 U.S. 949 (1971) (reversing sentences resulting in death without
discussion ofplea provisions).
65 See, e.g., Atkinson, 403 U.S. 948. This seems to be a logical conclusion because in Brady, Alford, and Parker, the Court made every effort to explain that
Jackson did not create new plea standards. The Court, however, struck down death
sentences based upon statutes similar to that in Jackson without opinion. The inference was that the sentence of death itself under a statutory scheme such as the
one set up in Jackson was unconstitutional, but not the plea machinery itself which
could, short of death, generate valid and constitutional pleas. See, e.g., Parker,397
U.S. at 794-95 (distinguishing between the imposition of the death penalty and an
otherwise valid plea under the statutory scheme); Ruiz v. State, 630 S.W.2d 44, 47
(Ark. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that a "plea bargain is not invalid per se merely
because it is induced by fear of receiving the death penalty or because in agreeing to
the plea bargain the defendant averts the possibility of receiving the death penalty"). Chief Judge Kaye recognized what the Supreme Court was trying to do when
she stated, "it was the death penalty provision itself.., that caused the constitutional infirmity." Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (N.Y. 1998).
66 Cf Hynes, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (invalidating the plea provisions relating to death
penalty cases instead of following the Supreme Court's example of invalidating the
death penalty). Chief Judge Kaye determined that invalidation of the death penalty
was not "necessary to obviate the Jackson problem: excision of the capital pleading
provisions eliminates the burden on constitutional rights prohibited by Jackson."Id.
at 1208.
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Court's decision in Corbitt v. New Jersey.67 In Corbitt, the Court
held that a state could encourage guilty pleas through the offering of benefits to defendants, such as lesser sentences. 68 The
Court of Appeals distinguished Hynes from Corbitt by noting
that in Corbitt, the possibility of the maximum sentence (life imprisonment) could occur either through a plea or a jury conviction. 69 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals concluded that all of
the states that have survived a Jackson challenge, with the exception of Arkansas, provide for the possibility of death in a
guilty plea. 70 Moreover, the court found support for its decision
in that other states have had to invalidate their plea provisions
because of the same constitutional infirmity.7 1 By finding that
invalidation of the death penalty provision would not cure the
statute's infirnity, nor comport with legislative intent, the court
concluded that excision of the plea provisions accomplished this
purpose. 72 Implicit within the Hynes ruling was the court's at439 U.S. 212 (1978).
See id. at 219-20. The Court looked at the cases after Jackson, and decided
that practices were sustained if they were not "needless" encouragement of guilty
pleas. Id. at 220 n.9. See generally Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (discussing the necessity of plea bargaining in the criminal system).
69 See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1206. "While a lesser sentence was permitted for
those defendants who pleaded guilty, it was not guaranteed." Id. This is precisely
the practical problem with the Hynes opinion. In invalidating the capital plea
scheme, the Court of Appeals simply invalidated per se, pleading itself, under the
capital statute. A capital defendant cannot, as a matter of right, plead guilty to a
capital offense under New York Law. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 220.10(2),
320.10(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2. Moreover, a capital defendant cannot constitutionally waive rights to a jury trial under a capital offense. A
death sentence imposed upon conviction may be a foregone conclusion because there
simply is no plea mechanism at all remaining under the statute after Hynes. Hynes
creates a new rule: should you be a capital defendant, you must assert your right to
a jury trial and risk death, no exceptions. The irony is noted in the opinion. See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1209.
70 See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1207. "Arkansas, avoided a Jackson problem because the Trial Judge, not the jury, made the final determination of whether the
death penalty would be imposed, and because guilty pleas were permitted only after
the prosecutor waived the death penalty." Id. (citation omitted). The possibility of
entering a guilty plea when subject to the death penalty is not an issue in New
York, as waiver of a jury trial in capital cases is barred by the state constitution.
71 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 595 A.2d 498, 501 (N.H. 1991) (finding that, under
Jackson, a death penalty provision that selectively allows defendants to escape a
death sentence by a guilty plea stifles the defendant's right to maintain his innocence); Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984) (concluding that
Jackson mandates that a defendant not be penalized by asserting his right to trial
by the imposition of a harsher sentence that if he pled guilty).
67
6
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tempt to reconcile the Jackson standard concerning capital
pleading schemes and New York's legislative policy in retaining
some form of the death penalty.73 Thus, the court responded to
the capital pleading provisions by striking them down, rather
than following the Supreme Court's example of striking down
the death sentences imposed under those systems but upholding
valid pleas imposed under those systems. 74 The Hynes decision
is consistent with the prior decision in People v. Michael, A C.,75
where the court invalidated provisions of the criminal code
which required the defendant to waive a jury trial in order to receive youthful offender status. 76 Even though this case did not
involve a death penalty provision, the Court of Appeals maintained consistency in Michael by striking the plea mechanism,
which created unequal imposition of penalties rather than the
77
penalties themselves.
Several important questions remain to be considered. Can
corrective legislation resolve the Hynes problem with respect to
New York's capital pleading provisions? Moreover, can the state
preserve its compelling interest in maintaining a flexible pleabargaining system with respect to capital crimes? Can these
remedial measures be drafted so as to comply with Constitutional requirements and promote effective administration of
capital statutes? As it stands, a capital defendant under Hynes
cannot enter a plea of guilty to first degree murder while a death
notice is pending. This is because the maximum penalty (life
imprisonment without parole) under sections 220.10(5)(e) and
72 See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1207-08 (concluding that elimination of those provisions leaves only one maximum penalty for first degree murder). Moreover, Chief
Judge Kaye noted that "the very purpose of the Legislature and Governor in enacting the statute was to provide for capital punishment in New York" Id. at 1208.
73 See id. The court noted the severability clause, which indicated the legislature intended that if plea provisions were declared unconstitutional, the rest of the
statute would survive. See id.
74 See supranotes 64-66 and accompanying text.
75 261 N.E.2d 620 (1970).
76 See id. at 624. Although not subject to the death penalty, defendants would
be exposed to longer prison sentences if they were not prosecuted as youthful offenders. See id. The court analogized the situation to Jackson, finding that this procedure gave incentives to defendants to waive their fundamental right to a jury
trial. See id. The court held that this could not be upheld under Jackson because it
"needlessly encourages" guilty pleas. Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570, 583 (1968)).
77 See Michael, 261 N.E.2d at 624.
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220.30(3)(b)(vii) is less than the maximum penalty at trial,
which is death. 78 A prosecutor can choose to withdraw its death
notice, and plea negotiations can take place because the maximum penalties are the same (life imprisonment without parole),
but the prosecutor then loses the possibility of re-filing the death
notice if plea negotiations break down.79 This frustrates legislative and public policy in enacting capital statutes. Another possibility is simply not to allow plea bargaining in capital cases,
thereby forcing a capital defendant to assert trial rights which
may "cost him his life."80 It is unlikely, however, that this is a
viable option.
Any corrective legislation must account for the state's compelling interest in maintaining a viable plea bargaining system.81
The Supreme Court has noted that "[d]isposition of charges after
plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process but a
highly desirable part for many reasons." 2 The value of the plea
bargaining system in congested urban centers such as New York
is self evident, considering the voluminous number of cases disposed of every year.8 3 The core of the plea bargain is that it "enables the parties to avoid the delay and uncertainties of trial and
appeal."8 4 With respect to New York's capital plea provisions,
corrective legislation, in the nature of allowing a prosecutor to
78 The court noted that the plea provisions as written prescribed a lesser sentence for those defendants who plead guilty. See Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1206. The
court, therefore, struck sections 220.10(5)(e) and 220.30(3)(b)(vii), which left the
statute to prohibit guilty pleas in first degree murder cases when intent to seek the
death penalty was exhibited. See id. at 1207-08. The court cautioned that the removal of the plea provisions did not bar guilty pleas in first degree murder cases
when there was no intent to seek the death penalty, as the maximum penalty was
the same in both situations. See id. at 1209.
79 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.40(4) (McKinney Supp. 1999) (indicating
that although a notice of intent to seek the death penalty may be withdrawn at any
time, once withdrawn, it cannot be refiled).
80 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968).
81 " 'Plea bargaining is now established as a vital part of our criminal justice
system... the volume of criminal prosecution is so great that if full trials were required in each case New York's law enforcement system would collapse.'" Hynes v.
Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687, 693 (2d Dep't 1997), rev'd, Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d
1201 (N.Y. 1998) (quoting People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1 (1989)). See People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 233 (1974) (noting that the negotiated plea "staves off collapse
of the law enforcement system").
82 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
83 See Selikoff, 318 N.E.2d at 788 (discussing the necessity of plea bargaining).
84 Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 693 (quoting People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1 (1989)).
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re-file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty once plea negotiations fail, may at least serve to retain the option of death, as a
possible sentence for capital defendants, as well as promote legislative policy.8 5 It has recently been suggested that legislation

aimed at retaining death by lethal injection as a possible sentence to a plea intended to alleviate the Jackson problem8 6 may
87
be constitutionally barred under New York's constitution.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will have a chance to revisit Jackson and clarify the complex and important issue of capital
pleading schemes,88 as New York's interest in maintaining the
integrity of its capital statutes and its plea negotiation systems
hangs in the balance.
David Guadagnoli

85 See N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW § 250.40 (McKinney Supp. 1999). For a thorough
discussion on the policy behind and implication of New York's death penalty statute,
see James R. Acker, When the Cheering Stopped: An Overview and Analysis of New
York's DeathPenalty Legislation, 17 PACE L. REV. 41 (1996).
86 See Wise, supranote 2.
87 See id. This may be prohibited because New York's constitution bars capital
defendants from waiving their rights to jury trials. See N.Y. CONST. art 1, § 2.
88 See Wise, supra note 2. Brooklyn District Attorney Charles J. Hynes declared
that he would seek leave to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court as he believed the
ruling would chill plea bargaining in all capital cases where a death notice has been
filed. See Spencer, supra note 2. As a final note, Shane Hale, the defendant in People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1997), rev'd, Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d
1201 (N.Y. 1998), is currently awaiting trial. Angel Mateo, the defendant in People
v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Monroe County Ct. 1998), was convicted of first degree
murder. The jury returned a verdict of death. He is currently awaiting sentencing.
See id.
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